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PRICE v. STATE: THE PRICE IS NOT RIGHT—MARYLAND’S
SHOWCASE SHOWDOWN WITH INCONSISTENT
CRIMINAL JURY VERDICTS
BRYAN L. MOSCA*
In Price v. State,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland re-examined
Maryland’s common law principle allowing inconsistent jury verdicts2
in criminal jury trials.3  The court held that inconsistent criminal jury
verdicts should no longer stand because recent exceptions to the gen-
eral rule have undermined the justification for tolerating such ver-
dicts.4  In so holding, the court properly furthered Maryland’s long-
standing policy of minimizing the occurrence of inconsistent verdicts,
albeit through flawed reasoning.5  By failing to limit the application of
its holding to legally inconsistent verdicts, the court created a rule that
has the potential to unnecessarily interfere with the jury’s role as the
“final arbiter of the facts.”6  Moreover, the court failed to provide suffi-
cient direction for trial judges who face inconsistent jury verdicts.7
Copyright  2009 by Bryan L. Mosca.
* Bryan L. Mosca is a second-year law student at the University of Maryland School of
Law where he is a staff member for the Maryland Law Review.  The author wishes to thank
Professor Abraham Dash for guiding him through the intricacies of Maryland and federal
criminal law.  Additionally, the author owes special thanks to Kerry T. Cooperman and
Heather R. Pruger for their remarkable support throughout the entire writing process.
1. 405 Md. 10, 949 A.2d 619 (2008).
2. An inconsistent verdict occurs when a jury renders a decision that no reasonable
jury following the court’s instructions could have produced.  Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin
of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 771, 778 (1998).
Inconsistent verdicts come in two general forms—multiple count inconsistencies and mul-
tiple defendant inconsistencies. Id.  The former arises when a jury returns “inconsistent
verdicts on multiple counts against a single defendant.” Id.  The latter occurs where a
single jury acquits all defendants but one of a crime that requires at least two participants.
Id. at 779.  This Note only focuses on inconsistent jury verdicts in a multi-count indictment
against a single defendant.
3. Price, 405 Md. at 18, 949 A.2d at 624.  In addition, the Maryland Court of Appeals
addressed whether Criminal Law Article, section 5-905 authorizes trial courts to enhance
sentences for “multiple counts arising from the same criminal transaction.” Id. at 12, 949
A.2d at 620.  The court affirmed the lower appellate court’s holding that the trial court
misapplied section 5-905, and reversed Price’s enhanced sentences. Id. at 29–34, 949 A.2d
at 630–33.  This Note does not discuss the court’s analysis of this issue.
4. Id. at 23, 949 A.2d at 627.
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Part IV.B.1.
7. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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I. THE CASE
On November 20, 2002, Officer Richard Pollock and Sergeant
William Harris (the “officers”) of the Baltimore City Police Depart-
ment staked out a known drug trafficking area on Winchester Street
in Baltimore City.8  The officers were in an unmarked vehicle when
they saw several people standing in the breezeway of an apartment
building.9  As the officers watched, at least fifteen people individually
approached the group, handed over money, received small unknown
objects, and then walked away.10  After observing these transactions,
the officers called for backup and then approached the group, which
immediately fled.11
Officer Pollock chased Lawrence Price, the appellant, and
Damien Tucker to a third-floor apartment.12  The officers entered the
apartment using a key from the rental office and apprehended Price,
who threw a bag containing a handgun and cash to the ground.13
Based on this evidence, the Maryland Attorney General’s Office in-
dicted Price on eighteen counts, including three substantive drug traf-
ficking charges,14 nine conspiracy and distribution charges,15 three
firearms offenses,16 and three simple possession charges.17
The trial judge instructed the jury that it could not find Price
guilty of possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug traffick-
ing crime unless they also found him guilty of one of the drug traffick-
ing crimes.18  The jury acquitted Price of all nine drug trafficking
charges and two of the firearm charges, but found him guilty of pos-
8. Price, 405 Md. at 12, 949 A.2d at 620–21.
9. Id. at 12–13, 949 A.2d at 621.
10. Id at 13, 949 A.2d at 621.
11. Id.
12. Id.  While following Price and Tucker upstairs, Officer Pollock saw Tucker drop a
bag containing suspected controlled dangerous substances. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 13–14, 949 A.2d at 621.  The three drug trafficking charges included posses-
sion of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana with intent to distribute them. Id. (citing MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5-621 (West 2002 & Supp. 2003)).
15. Id., 949 A.2d at 621 (noting that nine counts charged that “Price engaged in con-
spiracies with Tucker to distribute, or to possess with intent to distribute, or to possess
heroin, cocaine, and marijuana”).
16. Id., 949 A.2d at 621–22.  The three firearms charges included “(1) possessing a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, under sufficient circumstances
to constitute a nexus to the drug trafficking crime . . . , (2) possessing a regulated firearm
having been convicted of a prior disqualifying felony, and (3) unlawfully carrying or trans-
porting a handgun.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
17. Id. at 14, 949 A.2d at 622.  The prosecutor charged Price with possession of heroin,
cocaine, and marijuana. Id.
18. Id. at 14–15, 949 A.2d at 622 (stating the pertinent part of Judge Berger’s jury
instructions).
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sessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime
and of simple possession of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana.19
Price’s attorney moved to strike the guilty verdict on the firearm
charge, arguing that the charge was inconsistent with the drug traf-
ficking acquittals because commission of a drug trafficking crime is an
essential element of the firearm offense.20  The trial judge denied the
motion to strike on the grounds that Maryland common law allowed
inconsistent jury verdicts.21  At sentencing, the trial judge doubled the
sentences for Price’s possession convictions.22
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed Price’s incon-
sistent verdicts, but vacated his enhanced sentences.23  Although the
court held that Maryland common law generally tolerates inconsistent
verdicts,24 it vacated Price’s enhanced sentences because of the ambi-
guity surrounding Criminal Law Article, section 5-905.25  Thus, the
court concluded that the rule of lenity required the court to vacate
Price’s sentences.26
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted Price’s petition for
certiorari to reexamine the Maryland common law that normally per-
mits inconsistent jury verdicts in criminal jury trials.27  The court also
granted Maryland’s petition for a writ of certiorari to decide whether
section 5-905 of the Maryland Criminal Code authorizes trial courts to
enhance sentences for multiple counts arising out of the same
crime.28
19. Id. at 15, 949 A.2d at 622.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 16, 949 A.2d at 622–23.  The trial judge relied on Criminal Law Article, sec-
tion 5-905(a), under which “‘[a] person convicted of a subsequent crime under this title is
subject to . . . a term of imprisonment twice that otherwise authorized . . . .’” Id. at 16, 949
A.2d at 623 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5-905(a) (West 2002)).  The trial judge
originally sentenced Price to twelve years imprisonment for the firearms conviction, four
years for both the possession of heroin and cocaine convictions, and one year for the mari-
juana convictions. Id. at 15–16, 949 A.2d at 622–23.  Under section 5-905(a), the trial
judge doubled Price’s sentences for the three drug possession charges.  Id. at 16, 949 A.2d
at 623.
23. Price v. State, 172 Md. App. 363, 366–67, 915 A.2d 432, 434 (2007).
24. Id. at 388, 915 A.2d at 447 (citing Stucky v. State, 141 Md. App. 143, 157 n.3, 784
A.2d 652, 660 n.3 (2001)).
25. Id. at 382, 387–88, 915 A.2d at 443, 446 (recognizing that if an analysis of a statute
creates an absurd result, Maryland courts apply the rule of lenity).
26. Id. at 387–88, 915 A.2d at 446 (commenting that the rule of lenity requires ambigu-
ous penal statutes to “be strictly construed against the State and in favor of the defendant.”
(citing Scott v. State, 351 Md. 667, 675, 720 A.2d 291, 295 (1998))).
27. Price, 405 Md. at 12, 949 A.2d at 620.
28. Id.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-4\MLR410.txt unknown Seq: 4 17-JUN-09 11:57
1054 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 68:1051
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Most jurisdictions apply a general rule outlined by the Supreme
Court of the United States to assess inconsistent verdicts in criminal
jury trials.29  The Supreme Court’s rule prohibits appellate review of
jury verdicts on the grounds of inconsistency.30  Maryland originally
adopted this general rule,31 and has slowly developed a policy of mini-
mizing inconsistent verdicts, leading to numerous exceptions.32  Many
other jurisdictions have also implemented stylized versions of the Su-
preme Court’s rule—some courts follow the Supreme Court and allow
inconsistent criminal jury verdicts,33 while a minority of jurisdictions
have either partially or fully abolished inconsistent criminal jury
verdicts.34
A. Maryland Courts Have Adopted a Policy of Minimizing Inconsistent
Verdicts
Like most jurisdictions, Maryland courts have traditionally looked
to Supreme Court cases such as Dunn v. United States35 and United
States v. Powell36 for guidance on how to handle inconsistent verdicts.37
Maryland, however, has distinguished itself from other jurisdictions by
taking steps towards “minimiz[ing] the possibility of inconsistent ver-
dicts that result in a conviction contrary to law.”38
1. The Federal Common Law Rule Allows Inconsistent Verdicts to
Stand
In Dunn v. United States, Justice Holmes announced that
“[c]onsistency in the verdict is not necessary.”39  There, the Court up-
held James Dunn’s conviction of “maintaining a common nuisance by
keeping for sale at a specified place intoxicating liquor,” even though
that conviction was inconsistent with his acquittals on charges for un-
29. See infra Part II.A.1.
30. See infra Parts II.A.1 & II.B.1 (explaining the reasoning behind the general rule’s
acceptance).
31. The Maryland Court of Appeals first adopted the general rule in Leet v. State, 203
Md. 285, 293–94, 100 A.2d 789, 793–94 (1953).
32. See infra Part II.A.2.
33. See infra Part II.B.1.
34. See infra Part II.B.2.
35. 284 U.S. 390 (1932).
36. 496 U.S. 57 (1984).
37. See infra notes 54–55 (explaining Maryland’s adoption of the Dunn and Powell
rules); infra notes 104–120 (explaining how most states have adopted the Dunn and Powell
rules).
38. Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 597, 479 A.2d 1344, 1351 (1984).
39. Dunn, 284 U.S. at 393.
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lawful possession and unlawful sale of liquor.40  While part of Justice
Holmes’s reasoning may no longer hold true,41 many courts still cite
his proposition that even if “the verdict may have been the result of
compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury . . . verdicts cannot
be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters.”42  Instead, the
Court interpreted the acquittal as the jury exercising its power of len-
ity,43 and therefore, the jury’s verdict did not necessarily “ ‘show that
they were not convinced of the defendant’s guilt.’”44
Over the next half century, many federal circuit courts began rec-
ognizing exceptions to the Dunn rule.45  In United States v. Powell, the
Supreme Court responded to these exceptions by reaffirming that
jury verdicts need not be consistent.46  The Court noted that inconsis-
tent verdicts—including those in Powell where the defendant was
found guilty of the compound offense but acquitted of the underlying
felony—do not necessarily harm a defendant.47  Instead, the jury, con-
vinced of the defendant’s guilt, may have properly found the defen-
dant guilty of the compound offense, but “through mistake,
compromise, or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on the
40. Id. at 391–94.
41. Justice Holmes stated that if the government had decided to prosecute the defen-
dant separately for each count, “an acquittal on one could not be pleaded as res judicata of
the other.” Id. at 393.  After 1970, however, the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied to
separate indictments arising from the same issue of ultimate fact. Powell, 469 U.S. at 64
(citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970)).
42. Dunn, 284 U.S. at 394.
43. The jury’s power of lenity is its power to exercise mercy towards a defendant in-
stead of returning a verdict that speaks to the jury’s real conclusions. Id. at 393 (quoting
Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 1925)).  Lenity is usually exercised in two
instances.  Muller, supra note 2, at 784 (citing Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullifica-
tion, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 297–98, 301–02 (1996)).  The first occurs when a jury questions
the fairness of the applicable criminal law because it “believes that the . . . law . . . punishes
conduct that is not morally blameworthy.” Id.  In the second situation, the jury ignores the
fairness of the law, and instead believes that the law is unfair as applied to this particular
defendant. Id.
44. Dunn, 284 U.S. at 393 (quoting Steckler, 7 F.2d at 60).
45. Powell, 469 U.S. at 63–64.  In 1982, the First Circuit overturned a conspiracy convic-
tion where the jury had previously acquitted the defendant of “all the ‘overt acts’ charged
in support of the conspiracy.” Id. (citing United States v. Morales, 677 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1982)); see, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 703 F.2d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 1983) (overturning
the defendant’s conviction for using a telephone to facilitate a conspiracy when the jury
had previously acquitted the defendant for the conspiracy); United States v. Hannah, 584
F.2d 27, 30 (3rd Cir. 1978) (noting that because a predicate felony count and the com-
pound offense are not independent, an acquittal of the predicate requires an acquittal of
the compound offense).
46. Powell, 469 U.S. at 69 (reiterating the Dunn rule because the “best course to take is
simply to insulate jury verdicts from review” due to inconsistencies).
47. Id. at 65 (noting that, even where a jury does not follow the court’s instructions, it is
unclear which party received the benefit).
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lesser offense.”48  The Court recognized that it must protect the jury’s
power to exercise lenity, and consequently rejected as “imprudent and
unworkable” any rule that would allow a criminal defendant to claim
that “the verdict was not the product of lenity, but of some error that
worked against them.”49  In addition, a rule that allows a defendant to
assess the jury’s verdict for such errors would interfere with the jury’s
power as the arbiter of the facts.50
The Court noted that review for sufficiency of the evidence still
protects a criminal defendant against jury irrationality and error by
allowing trial and appellate courts to assess whether the evidence
presented at trial “could support any rational determination of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.”51  As a result, the government has the
burden of proof and must also convince the reviewing court that its
evidence could have rationally led the jury to reach a verdict of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.52
2. Maryland’s Policy of Reducing the Impact of Inconsistent Verdicts
Similar to other jurisdictions,53 Maryland courts have consistently
held that “ ‘[c]onsistency in the verdict is not necessary.’”54  Although
an inconsistent jury decision may result from compromise or mistake
rather than lenity, the Court of Appeals has ruled that courts should
not interfere in the province of the jury by speculating into such mat-
ters.55  Maryland, however, has attempted to minimize the “deleteri-
ous result” of inconsistent verdicts56 through two distinct methods: (1)
by adopting several exceptions to the general rule on allowing incon-
48. Id.  In addition, the Supreme Court reasoned that because the government cannot
appeal an inconsistent acquittal, a defendant should not be able to appeal an inconsistent
conviction. Id.
49. Id. at 66.
50. Id. at 66–67 (“Such individualized assessment of the reason for the inconsistency
would be based either on pure speculation, or would require inquiries into the jury’s delib-
erations that courts generally will not undertake.”).
51. Id. at 67 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80
(1942)).
52. Id.
53. See infra Part II.B.1.
54. See, e.g., Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 592, 594, 479 A.2d 1344, 1348–49 (1984) (quot-
ing Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393–94 (1932)) (recognizing that the Dunn stan-
dard was incorporated into Maryland common law as early as 1975); see also Ledbetter v.
State, 224 Md. 271, 273–74, 167 A.2d 596, 597–98 (1961) (applying the Dunn principle that
“‘[c]onsistency in a verdict is not necessary’” (quoting Dunn, 284 U.S. at 393)); infra Part
II.A.1.
55. Johnson v. State, 238 Md. 528, 542, 209 A.2d 765, 771 (1965) (quoting Dunn, 284
U.S. at 394).
56. Mack, 300 Md. at 595, 479 A.2d at 1350.
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sistencies,57 and (2) by promulgating procedural methods that would
disfavor inconsistent verdicts.58
a. Maryland’s Common Law Exceptions to the General Rule
Allowing Inconsistencies Has Led to Fewer Inconsistent
Verdicts
Since Maryland adopted the Dunn rule on inconsistent verdicts in
Leet v. State,59 Maryland has adopted a policy of limiting this rule.60
Maryland prohibits inconsistent verdicts in nonjury trials,61 between
the jury and the trial judge,62 and in civil cases.63
Even before Maryland adopted the Dunn rule, Maryland courts
discouraged inconsistent guilty verdicts.  In Heinze v. State,64 the Court
of Appeals of Maryland held that guilty verdicts on two counts are
“inconsistent in law and consequently . . . inadequate to support a
judgment” if the defendant could not have logically committed the
separate offenses.65  The Heinze court held that a trial judge could not
convict a defendant for stealing money and for knowingly receiving
stolen money in the same case; the defendant could have committed
only one of the crimes.66  The court noted that if a “verdict [wa]s am-
biguous, inconsistent, unresponsive, or otherwise defective,” the trial
judge must instruct the jury to correct it either in the presence of the
court, or to return to the jury room for further deliberation.67  In giv-
ing this instruction, the judge must not influence the jury by explicitly
or implicitly suggesting an outcome.68
57. See infra Part II.A.1.a.
58. See infra Part II.A.1.b.
59. 203 Md. 285, 294, 100 A.2d 789, 794 (1953).
60. See infra notes 74–96 and accompanying text.
61. See Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 55–56, 512 A.2d 358, 362–63 (1986) (holding that
inconsistent verdicts by a trial judge cannot stand because the considerations justifying
inconsistent jury verdicts do not apply to trial judges).
62. See Galloway v. State, 371 Md. 379, 400, 809 A.2d 653, 666 (2002) (holding that a
judge’s inconsistent verdict that effectively nullified a jury’s interpretation of the facts was
inappropriate under Maryland common law principles).
63. S. Mgmt. Corp. v. Taha, 378 Md. 461, 488, 495, 836 A.2d 627, 643, 647 (2003)
(holding that the irreconcilably inconsistent jury verdicts must be set aside); see also Price v.
State, 405 Md. 10, 26, 949 A.2d 619, 628–29 (2008) (recognizing that “the Court in Taha
held that inconsistent jury verdicts in civil cases would not be allowed”); State v. Williams,
397 Md. 172, 189 n.5, 916 A.2d 294, 304 n.5 (2007) (recognizing that Taha held that “irrec-
oncilably defective verdicts [in civil cases] cannot stand”).
64. 184 Md. 613, 42 A.2d 128 (1945).
65. Id. at 617, 42 A.2d at 130.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 618, 42 A.2d 131.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-4\MLR410.txt unknown Seq: 8 17-JUN-09 11:57
1058 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 68:1051
In Leet v. State, Maryland first cited to the Dunn rule when uphold-
ing a defendant’s conviction for willfully failing to file his income tax
return, despite the defendant’s acquittal on the charge of failing to
pay his income tax.69  The court stated that even if it assumed the
verdicts were inconsistent, it was not necessarily required to reverse
the conviction.70  For support, the court quoted Justice Holmes’s rule
from Dunn: ‘“Consistency in the verdict is not necessary.  Each count
in an indictment is regarded as if it was a separate indictment.’”71
The court reconciled the inconsistent verdict as the jury’s valid exer-
cise of lenity, noting that even though the verdict may have been the
result of a compromise or mistake, the court should not speculate into
such matters.72  After Leet, the Court of Appeals continued to follow
the Supreme Court’s Dunn rule, allowing inconsistent jury verdicts to
stand, but not without establishing exceptions along the way.73
In Shell v. State,74 the Court of Appeals abolished inconsistent ver-
dicts rendered by a trial judge.75  The court held that the reasons for
allowing inconsistent verdicts in a jury trial are not applicable to a
bench trial.76  The court distinguished the role of a trial judge from
that of the jury, noting that the judge is not the “voice of the country,
even when he sits in the jury’s place.”77  And unlike a jury, a trial judge
need not “reach unanimity with himself” by providing inconsistent
verdicts.78  Thus, the Shell court determined, when a trial judge ren-
ders inconsistent verdicts, the appellate court must either reverse or
vacate those verdicts unless the trial judge explains on the record the
69. 203 Md. 285, 293–94, 100 A.2d 789, 793–94 (1953).
70. Id. at 293, 100 A.2d at 793.
71. Id. at 293–94, 100 A.2d at 793 (quoting Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393
(1932)).
72. Id. at 294, 100 A.2d at 793–94 (citing Dunn, 284 U.S. at 393–94).
73. See infra notes 74–91 and accompanying text.
74. 307 Md. 46, 512 A.2d 358 (1986).
75. Id. at 55, 512 A.2d at 362 (holding that the reasons for allowing inconsistent ver-
dicts rendered by the jury to stand do not justify inconsistent verdicts from the trial judge);
see also State v. Williams, 397 Md. 172, 189–90, 916 A.2d 294, 305 (2007) (“[I]t is also well
settled in Maryland that inconsistent verdicts of guilty and not guilty, by a trial judge at a
nonjury trial, are not ordinarily permitted.” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
76. Shell, 307 Md. at 55–58, 512 A.2d at 362–64 (citing Johnson v. State, 238 Md. 528,
543–44, 209 A.2d 765, 772 (1965); United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 905 (2d Cir.
1960)).
77. Id. at 55, 512 A.2d at 362 (quoting Johnson, 238 Md. at 543, 209 A.2d at 772) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Williams, 397 Md. 172, 189–90, 916 A.2d 294,
305 (2007) (noting that Maryland law does not permit inconsistent verdicts by a trial
judge).
78. Williams, 397 Md. at 190, 916 A.2d at 305 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
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apparent inconsistency and the appellate court accepts this
reasoning.79
In 2002, the Court of Appeals of Maryland prohibited inconsis-
tent verdicts based on identical evidence in a criminal trial when a
jury rules on some counts and the trial judge rules inconsistently on
others.80  In Galloway v. State,81 the court precluded a trial judge from
ruling inconsistently from the jury in a criminal trial and, in effect,
nullifying the jury’s verdicts.82  The court reiterated that the reasons
for allowing inconsistent verdicts in a jury trial are absent when a
judge makes the ruling.83  Because the trial judge had created the in-
consistency84 and both verdicts depended upon identical evidence,
the appellate court could not justify the inconsistency and thus re-
versed the trial judge’s guilty verdicts.85
Finally, in Southern Management Corporation v. Taha,86 the court
held in the context of a civil case that “irreconcilably inconsistent jury
verdicts . . . cannot stand.”87  Here, the Court of Appeals ruled that a
jury could not find a principal corporation liable under the doctrine
of respondeat superior when the same jury had exonerated the co-
defendant employees.88  The court relied on its reasoning in S & R,
79. Id. (quoting State v. Anderson, 320 Md. 17, 29–30, 575 A.2d 1227, 1233 (1990)).
Under Maryland law, a jury may amend or change any verdict before the court has re-
corded the verdict.  Heinze v. State, 184 Md. 613, 617, 42 A.2d 128, 130 (1945).
80. Galloway v. State, 371 Md. 379, 401, 809 A.2d 653, 667 (2002).
81. 371 Md. 379, 809 A.2d 653.
82. Id. at 416–17, 809 A.2d at 675–76.
83. Id. at 408, 809 A.2d at 671.
84. The trial judge ruled after the jury had returned a final verdict. Id. at 416, 809 A.2d
at 675.
85. Id.
86. 378 Md. 461, 836 A.2d 627 (2003).
87. Id. at 467, 836 A.2d at 630; see also supra note 63 (recognizing that subsequent cases
have applied the Taha holding to all civil cases).  The Court of Special Appeals first
adopted the rule allowing inconsistent civil verdicts to stand in Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v.
Balbos, 84 Md. App. 10, 35–36, 578 A.2d 228, 240 (1990) (noting that the rule allowing
inconsistent verdicts to stand “has previously been applied by Maryland courts only in crim-
inal cases”).  The Court of Appeals, however, reversed part of that opinion and made no
mention of inconsistent verdicts. See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179,
236–37, 604 A.2d 445, 473 (1992) (reversing in part and affirming in part).  Despite this
fact, the Court of Special Appeals later adopted its Balbos rule that “[i]nconsistency in civil
verdicts often is the result of compromise to reach unanimity or mistake; nevertheless,
‘verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry as to such matters.’”  Davis v. Goodman,
117 Md. App. 378, 423, 700 A.2d 798, 820 (1997) (quoting Balbos, 84 Md. App. at 35–36,
578 A.2d at 228).
88. Taha, 378 Md. at 486, 836 A.2d at 641. But see United States v. Dotterweich, 320
U.S. 277, 279 (1943) (invoking the Dunn rule in upholding the president of a corpora-
tion’s conviction when the same jury had previously acquitted the corporation of the same
charge).
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Inc. v. Nails89 to identify “a distinction between inconsistent verdicts in
criminal cases and irreconcilably inconsistent jury verdicts in civil mat-
ters.”90  The dissent criticized the majority’s reliance on S & R, Inc.
because the S & R, Inc. jury used a special verdict form, while the
Taha jury returned a general verdict.91  Thus, following Taha, incon-
sistent criminal jury verdicts remained the sole surviving part of Dunn
and Powell’s general rule in Maryland.
b. Maryland’s Procedural Rules Reduce Inconsistent Verdicts in
Criminal Cases
To further minimize inconsistent verdicts, Maryland courts
adopted procedural rules applicable at the trial and appellate levels.
Despite these rules, Maryland courts generally hesitate “to interfere
with the results of unknown jury interplay, at least without proof of
actual irregularity.”92
In 1984, the Court of Appeals modified the general rule of al-
lowing inconsistent verdicts in criminal cases to avoid their “deleteri-
ous result.”93  Specifically, the court stated that when a defendant
faces indictment for both use of a handgun in the commission of a
crime and the underlying crime, the trial judge must instruct the jury
that it may not find the defendant guilty of the handgun charge with-
out first finding him guilty of the underlying crime.94  In 1999, the
Court of Special Appeals clarified that when a trial court fails to give
such an instruction, the appellate court should overturn a defendant’s
89. 85 Md. App. 570, 589–90, 584 A.2d 722, 731 (1991) (involving irreconcilably incon-
sistent verdicts awarding punitive damages on a fraud claim where the jury had determined
that the defendant had acted only with implied rather than actual malice), rev’d on other
grounds, 334 Md. 398, 639 A.2d 660 (1994).
90. Taha, 378 Md. at 488, 836 A.2d at 642–43 (citing Nails, 85 Md. App. at 590, 584
A.2d at 731) (emphasis added) (holding that a verdict is irreconcilably defective when an
answer to one question in a special verdict required a verdict for the plaintiff, while an
answer on another question required a verdict for the defendant).  The Taha court noted
that it would leave for another day the issue of inconsistent verdicts in criminal cases. Id. at
488 n.8, 836 A.2d at 642 n.8.
91. Id. at 503–04, 836 A.2d at 652 (Raker, J., dissenting) (noting that a general verdict
does not require a specific finding of fact by the jury).
92. Hoffert v. State, 319 Md. 377, 384, 572 A.2d 536, 540 (1990) (quoting Shell v. State,
307 Md. 46, 54, 512 A.2d 358, 362 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 595, 479 A.2d 1344, 1350 (1984).
94. Id. at 595–96, 479 A.2d at 1350. See also Hoffert, 319 Md. at 385, 572 A.2d at 540
(commenting that such an instruction “‘is beneficial because it minimizes the possibility of
inconsistent verdicts that result in a conviction contrary to law’” (quoting Mack, 300 Md. at
597 A.2d at 1344)).  In addition, the instruction must meet the requirements of Maryland
Rules, section 4-325(c), which requires a judge to give an instruction that correctly states
the applicable law. Id. at 592, 479 A.2d at 1348.
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conviction if the trial court could have avoided an inconsistent verdict
by giving an appropriate instruction.95
In 2002, the Maryland Court of Appeals, however, recognized the
possible double jeopardy implications of overturning an inconsistent
verdict.96  Specifically, in Galloway v. State, the court noted that it can-
not retry a defendant on a count for which a jury had previously ac-
quitted him.97  While a new trial on a final inconsistent acquittal
would violate the Fifth Amendment, a new trial on an inconsistent
guilty verdict would not.98  For the same reasons, the court in Ferrell v.
State99 held that an acquittal on the underlying offense in a previous
trial precludes relitigation of a compound offense where a jury already
found the defendant not guilty of an element of that compound
offense.100
On review, a trial judge may set aside an inconsistent verdict that
is contrary to the court’s advisory instructions and may grant a new
trial.101  Although an appellate court can review the trial court’s grant
of a new trial,102 it does not generally review a trial court’s failure to
offer relief for an inconsistent verdict.103
95. Bates v. State, 127 Md. App. 678, 699–700, 736 A.2d 407, 418 (1999) (noting that
the court will review inconsistent verdicts on appeal even if the defendant failed to prop-
erly object at trial).  Despite this rule, the jury retains its right as the final arbiter in the
determination of the defendant’s guilt. See Hoffert, 319 Md. at 385, 572 A.2d at 540 (noting
that such an instruction does not interfere with the jury’s duty because ‘“the jury retains its
power to err, either fortuitously or deliberately, and to compromise or exercise lenity”’
(quoting Mack, 300 Md. at 597, 479 A.2d at 1351)).
96. See Galloway v. State, 371 Md. 379, 390–91, 809 A.2d 653, 660–61 (2002) (noting
that the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy “protects a man who has
been acquitted from having to run the gantlet a second time” (quoting Ashe v. Swenson,
397 U.S. 436, 442–46 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  In Benton v. Maryland,
the Supreme Court made the Double Jeopardy Clause applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.  395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969).
97. See Galloway, 371 Md. at 392, 809 A.2d at 661 (acknowledging the collateral estop-
pel form of double jeopardy (citing Butler v. State, 335 Md. 238, 253, 643 A.2d 389, 396
(1994))).
98. See id. (quoting Butler, 335 Md. at 253–54, 643 A.2d at 396) (noting that the double
jeopardy clause only precludes re-litigation of verdicts in the defendant’s favor).
99. 318 Md. 235, 567 A.2d 937 (1990).
100. Id. at 248, 567 A.2d at 944 (holding that an earlier acquittal on the predicate hand-
gun charge resolved the issue and precluded the State from relitigating the armed robbery
charge).
101. Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 599–600, 479 A.2d 1344, 1352 (1984) (citing Stevenson
v. State, 289 Md. 167, 179, 423 A.2d 558, 565 (1980)).
102. Id. at 600, 479 A.2d at 1352.  The appellate court reviews trial court’s discretion
under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. (citing Kirsner v. State, 296 Md. 567, 570–71,
463 A.2d 865, 867 (1983)).
103. Id. (citing Carlile v. Two Guys from Harrison, Glen Burnie, Inc., 264 Md. 475, 477,
287 A.2d 31, 33 (1972)).
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B. Other Jurisdictions’ Responses to Dunn and Powell
Most jurisdictions have adopted Powell and Dunn’s general rules
allowing inconsistent criminal jury verdicts.104  A minority of jurisdic-
tions, however, prohibit inconsistent verdicts in certain situations.105
1. The Majority Approach Allows Inconsistent Verdicts to Stand
Most states have adopted a general policy allowing inconsistent
verdicts to stand based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Powell
and Dunn.106  This majority generally offers two reasons for upholding
inconsistent verdicts.  First, these courts note that lenity is an appro-
priate jury power, and while a verdict may result from compromise or
mistake on the part of the jury, a judge should not upset the verdict by
speculation into such matters.107  Second, these courts agree with Pow-
ell that defendants receive adequate protection against jury irrational-
ity or error by a sufficiency of the evidence review at the trial and
appellate levels.108
104. See infra Part II.B.1.  For a list of states that follow the Supreme Court’s general
rule, see Muller, supra note 2, at 787 n.80.  Since 1998, two additional states have decided
to not allow legally inconsistent criminal jury verdicts. See Priest v. State, 879 A.2d 575, 587
(Del. 2005) (reasoning that, by statute, the Powell lenity rule could not save inconsistent
verdicts when the jury refused to find the defendant guilty of the predicate felony); State v.
Arroyo, 844 A.2d 163, 170–72 (R.I. 2004) (accepting the Dunn rule that as long as verdicts
are “legally consistent,” even logically inconsistent jury verdicts will stand).  In addition,
one state at the intermediate appellate level has prohibited legally inconsistent verdicts.
See State v. Flemons, 144 S.W.3d 877, 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (reversing the unlawful use
of a weapon charge because it was dependent on a guilty finding on possession of mari-
juana with intent to distribute); see also State v. Staten, 478 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Mo. 1972)
(vacating the defendant’s burglarious stealing conviction because the jury failed to convict
the defendant of burglary, a necessary element of the stealing charge). But see State v.
Clemons, 643 S.W.2d 803, 805 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (“An inconsistent verdict among
several charges does not require a reversal provided there is sufficient evidence to support
the jury’s finding of guilt.”).  In addition, Illinois allows inconsistent verdicts to stand. See
People v. Jones, 797 N.E.2d 640, 649 (Ill. 2003) (restating conviction for mob action de-
spite acquittal on battery charges).
105. See infra Part II.B.2; see also Muller, supra note 2, at 787 n.79 (listing the states that
prohibit inconsistent verdicts to stand).  Despite the fact that Indiana has never reversed a
case due to inconsistent verdicts, Indiana courts must still analyze verdicts for consistency.
Owsley v. State, 769 N.E.2d 181, 183–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
106. See, e.g., State v. McClary, 679 N.W.2d 455, 459 (N.D. 2004) (noting that state courts
and the vast majority of federal courts have adopted Powell); see also supra Part II.A.1.  For a
list of the states that have adopted the Supreme Court’s rule, see supra note 104.
107. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 749 A.2d 710, 713 (D.C. 2000) (interpreting an
inconsistent acquittal as the jury’s exercise of lenity); Bollinger v. State, 901 P.2d 671,
675–76 (Nev. 1995) (accepting a jury’s inconsistent verdicts on the basis that the jury could
have possibly exercised lenity).
108. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 797 N.E.2d 640, 644–45 (Ill. 2003) (citing United States v.
Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984)) (noting that “a defendant is still protected from jury irra-
tionality because the defendant can always challenge his or her conviction on sufficiency of
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In general, the majority of state courts do not interpret an incon-
sistent verdict as a windfall for the government at the defendant’s ex-
pense.109  Instead, the jury could have properly reached its conclusion
on the first count, but then through mistake, compromise, or lenity,
arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on the predicate offense.110  In
these instances, it is impossible for the defendant to determine that
his or her verdict was not the product of lenity without an assessment
based on pure speculation or an inquiry into the jury deliberations
that courts will not undertake.111  These courts find that the defen-
dant received the benefit of an acquittal, and it is not unjust to require
the defendant to accept the jury’s conviction on the second related
count.112  Moreover, the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double
jeopardy prevents the government from objecting to any such acquit-
tal113 and as a result, courts agree that it would be unfair for the de-
fendant to have this option when the government does not.114
The jury has an “‘unreviewable power . . . to return a verdict of
not guilty for impermissible reasons.’”115  Many jurisdictions hold that
the evidence grounds”); State v. Goins, 92 P.3d 181, 185–86 (Wash. 2004) (noting that the
irreconcilably inconsistent verdicts can stand if supported by sufficient evidence).
109. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 565 A.2d 1035, 1039–40 (N.H. 1989) (“[E]ven if inconsis-
tent verdicts reflect jury error, it should not be assumed that they necessarily aid the
government.”).
110. See, e.g., People v. Frye, 898 P.2d 559, 569–70 (Colo. 1995) (citing Powell, 469 U.S. at
65) (adopting the Supreme Court rule in holding that the defendant cannot “attack his
conviction for menacing with a deadly weapon on the ground that it is inconsistent with his
acquittal of first degree sexual assault”); Brown, 565 A.2d. at 1039 (positing that a jury
could “reach[ ] the guilty verdict on one count, and through leniency or mistake arrived at
the not guilty verdict on a different count of the same offense”).
111. See, e.g., State v. Beach, 67 P.3d 121, 132, 134–35 (Kan. 2003) (quoting Steckler v.
United States, 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 1925)) (recognizing the sole inquiry as whether after
reviewing all the evidence a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty be-
yond a reasonable doubt).
112. See, e.g., State v. Juelfs, 270 N.W.2d 873, 873–74 (1978) (finding that logically incon-
sistent verdicts do not warrant a dismissal); accord Powell, 469 U.S. at 69 (“Respondent is
given the benefit of her acquittal on the counts on which she was acquitted, and it is
neither irrational nor illogical to require her to accept the burden of conviction on the
counts on which the jury convicted.”).
113. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957) (citing United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662, 671 (1896)) (noting that the government cannot appeal an acquittal even if it
appears erroneous).
114. See, e.g., Ward v. State, 653 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (acknowledg-
ing that under the Double Jeopardy Clause because the government has no recourse to
correct jury error, the defendant should not have that option either); Commonwealth v.
Campbell, 651 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Pa. 1994) (recognizing that the Constitution’s Due Pro-
cess Clause precludes the government from challenging an acquittal).
115. See, e.g., Hammond v. State, 497 So. 2d 558, 563 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (quoting
Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 (1981)) (noting that Alabama courts have adopted the
Dunn rule).
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courts should not correct jury verdict inconsistencies, “so long as the
evidence is sufficient . . . to support the guilty verdicts.”116  Under the
sufficiency of the evidence standard promulgated in Jackson v. Vir-
ginia,117 a reviewing court must “determine whether the record evi-
dence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.”118  Such a standard sufficiently protects the defen-
dant from jury irrationality or error.119  The sole question under such
a review is whether the prosecutor has provided adequate evidence to
convict the defendant of the charged offense; if yes, the conviction
must stand.120
2. The Minority Approach Limits or Rejects Inconsistent Verdicts in
Criminal Cases
A few states prohibit inconsistent verdicts in criminal jury trials at
least to some extent.121  Most prohibit only legally inconsistent ver-
dicts,122 while Alaska prohibits both legally and factually inconsistent
verdicts.123  A factually or logically inconsistent verdict occurs if a jury
returns verdicts that both acquit and convict a defendant of crimes
composed of different elements, but that arise out of the same set of
facts.124 A legally inconsistent verdict occurs when “the essential ele-
ments of the count[s] of which the defendant is acquitted are identi-
cal and necessary to prove the count of which the defendant is
116. See, e.g., State v. Sampson, 656 So. 2d 1085, 1088–89 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (citing
Powell, 469 U.S. at 67) (noting that the proper inquiry is whether there was sufficient evi-
dence for a rational trier of fact to find a defendant guilty).
117. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
118. Id. at 318.
119. See, e.g., State v. Bartlett, 355 S.E.2d 913, 920 (W. Va. 1987) (quoting Powell, 469
U.S. at 67) (“[A] criminal defendant is already afforded protection . . . [by] the sufficiency
of the evidence review undertaken by the trial and appellate courts.”).
120. See Powell, 469 U.S. at 67 (reasoning that the government with its evidence must
convince the jury, and must convince the court that given the evidence “the jury could
rationally have reached a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”).
121. See supra notes 104–105.
122. See infra notes 128–140 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 141–148 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., State v. Arroyo, 844 A.2d 163, 171 (R.I. 2004).  In other words, a factual
inconsistency occurs if a jury renders different verdicts on two crimes with distinct ele-
ments when there was only one set of proof given at trial.  Steven T. Wax, Inconsistent and
Repugnant Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 713, 740 (1979).  For example,
this occurs when a jury convicts a defendant of manslaughter as to the driver of a car, but
acquits the defendant as to the passenger of the same car, even though the deaths of both
the driver and passenger resulted from the same action.  See Naumowicz v. State, 562 So. 2d
710, 713 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that a jury does not necessarily return a flawed
verdict when its verdict is inconsistent with a verdict on another count).
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convicted,”125 and a jury implicitly finds that a defendant has both met
and not met the same essential elements of two different crimes.126
The courts that strike down legal inconsistencies reason that such ver-
dicts are “inescapably inconsistent” because courts cannot convict a
person of an offense unless the prosecutor proves each element be-
yond a reasonable doubt.127
Most courts that set aside inconsistent criminal jury verdicts re-
strict their review to instances of legally inconsistent verdicts.128  These
courts believe that by restricting their review they still can follow the
principles of Powell.129
New York and Florida courts have the most evolved jurisprudence
on how to handle inconsistent verdicts.  In People v. Tucker,130 the New
York Court of Appeals assessed the permissibility of inconsistent crimi-
nal jury verdicts.131  The court noted that even though most jurisdic-
tions accept inconsistent verdicts, allowing legally inconsistent verdicts
to stand “is not merely inconsistent with justice, but is repugnant to
125. Arroyo, 844 A.2d at 171 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  The Illi-
nois Supreme Court defined a legally inconsistent verdict as when the jury returns
“[v]erdicts of guilty of crime A but not guilty of crime B, where both crimes arise out of the
same set of facts,” and the verdicts “necessarily involve the conclusion that the same essen-
tial element or elements of each crime were found both to exist and not to exist.”  People
v. Frias, 457 N.E.2d 1233, 1235 (Ill. 1983) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
For example, a jury returns a legally inconsistent verdict when it acquits a defendant of an
underlying felony, but still finds the defendant guilty of a compound offense.  Naumowicz,
562 So. 2d at 713.
126. See People v. Tucker, 431 N.E.2d 617, 618 (N.Y. 1981) (noting that such verdicts are
not merely inconsistent with justice, but also repugnant).
127. See, e.g., Priest v. State, 879 A.2d 575, 581 (Del. 2005) (recognizing the “fundamen-
tal tenet of [Delaware] criminal law” under which “[n]o person may be convicted of an
offense unless each element of the offense is proven beyond a reasonable doubt”).
128. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 218, 220 (Fla. 2007) (recognizing that the only
exception to the general rule allowing inconsistent verdicts is those verdicts in which an
acquittal on one count negates a necessary element for a conviction on another count);
Tucker, 431 N.E.2d at 619 (noting that courts should only reverse a jury verdict where an
acquittal on one crime is conclusive as to a necessary element of the a second crime for
which the guilty verdict was rendered).
129. Compare supra Part II.A.1 (describing the majority policy in allowing inconsistent
verdicts to stand), with Brown, 959 So. 2d at 220 (citing Eaton v. State, 438 So. 2d 822, 823
(Fla. 1983)) (noting that certain “[i]nconsistent verdicts are allowed because jury verdicts
can be the result of lenity and therefore do not always speak to the guilt or innocence of
the defendant”), Arroyo, 844 A.2d at 172 (noting that, so long as the verdicts are legally
consistent, the court will not speculate as to what the jury may have believed), and State v.
Eckhart, 367 A.2d 1073, 1077 (R.I. 1977) (upholding verdicts that are logically inconsis-
tent, but not legally inconsistent because the former does not interfere with the province
of the jury).
130. 431 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1981).
131. Id. at 618–20.
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it.”132  Next, the court deliberated between two approaches for deter-
mining whether a jury verdict is repugnant.133  The court adopted an
approach that avoided speculation into the jury’s considerations and
instead only uncovered legal inconsistencies on the face of the ver-
dicts.134  In an effort to limit appeals, New York courts also require a
defendant to assert any claims of inconsistency prior to a jury’s dis-
charge, when the trial court is still able to remedy the defect.135
Similarly, Florida allows inconsistent verdicts unless “an acquittal
on one count negates a necessary element for conviction on another
count.”136  For example, in Naumowicz v. State,137 a Florida court ex-
pressly refused to extend the preceding exception to factually incon-
sistent verdicts.138  Here, the court reconciled the defendant’s
conviction for the death of his passenger and acquittal for the death
of the other driver as not necessarily inconsistent, even though both
deaths resulted from the same act of the defendant.139  The court ra-
tionalized the apparent inconsistency as the result of the jury’s right to
pardon the defendant.140
Alaska is the only jurisdiction that forbids both legally and factu-
ally inconsistent verdicts.141  In DeSacia v. State,142 the court addressed
a situation similar to Naumowicz.  Instead of reconciling the verdicts as
the Naumowicz court did, however, the Supreme Court of Alaska
found that the jury could not convict DeSacia of manslaughter as to
132. Id. at 618–19 (noting that legally inconsistent verdicts arise when a jury finds the
essential elements of one crime, but fails to find one or more of the same elements in a
second crime).
133. Id. at 619.  Under the first approach, review of the record to “discover the underly-
ing basis of the jury’s determination,” the court must “intrude into the jury’s deliberative
process by speculating on how the jury perceived and weighed the evidence,” which courts
are reluctant to do. Id.  In addition, this approach would undermine the jury’s ability to
show lenity to the defendant. Id. Under the second approach, review of the jury charge
for its findings on essential elements, the court will only reverse a conviction “where acquit-
tal on one crime . . . is conclusive as to a necessary element of the other crime . . . for which
the guilty verdict was rendered.” Id. (citing Wax, supra note 124, at 740–42).
134. Id. at 619–20.
135. People v. Satloff, 437 N.E.2d 271, 272 (N.Y. 1982) (citing People v. Stahl, 425
N.E.2d 876, 877 (N.Y. 1981)) (requiring that a defendant must assert his claims of inconsis-
tency “prior to the discharge of the jury properly to preserve the issue for review”).
136. Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 218, 220 (Fla. 2007).
137. 562 So. 2d 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
138. Id. at 713 (citing Gonzalez v. State, 449 So. 2d 882, 887–88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 458 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1984)).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See DeSacia v. State, 469 P.2d 369, 378 (Alaska 1970) (holding that courts must
prevent only “strictly inconsistent” jury’s verdict).
142. 469 P.2d 369.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-4\MLR410.txt unknown Seq: 17 17-JUN-09 11:57
2009] PRICE V. STATE 1067
the passenger and acquit as to the driver because both deaths
stemmed from DeSacia’s alleged negligence toward the vehicle in
which both victims were occupants.143  The court held that “the two
verdicts are, in fact, irreconcilably in conflict.”144  In reaching its deci-
sion, the court reviewed Dunn and determined that allowing such ver-
dicts creates the risk that verdicts may result from compromise or
confusion.145  Thus, the court vacated DeSacia’s guilty verdict.146  The
court decided that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred it from retrying
the defendant for his prior acquittal on the death of the driver,147 but
determined that the defendant could not prevent a new trial on his
overturned conviction for manslaughter of the passenger by making a
collateral estoppel claim.148
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Price v. State,149 the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed in
part and reversed in part the holding of the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland.150  The Court of Appeals first affirmed that, under Crim-
inal Law Article, section 5-905, Price’s enhanced sentences could not
stand.151  The Court of Appeals continued its precedential trend of
customizing the Supreme Court’s general rules for inconsistent jury
verdicts and reversed part of the decision of the Court of Special Ap-
peals by abolishing inconsistent jury verdicts in criminal cases.152
In overturning the lower court’s holding and reversing the defen-
dant’s conviction, the Court of Appeals reconciled the “confusing and
somewhat inconsistent” common law principles governing inconsis-
tent verdicts by explaining that Maryland courts have traditionally per-
mitted inconsistent jury verdicts in part because of the historic fact-
finding function of the jury and because most inconsistent jury ver-
dicts resulted from “lenity, mistake, or a compromise to reach una-
nimity.”153  While a jury’s fact-finding role is similar in both criminal
143. Id. at 374.
144. Id. at 373.
145. Id. at 377.
146. Id. at 378.
147. Id. at 380.
148. Id. at 380–81.
149. 405 Md. 10, 949 A.2d 619 (2008).
150. Id. at 34, 949 A.2d at 633–34.
151. Id. at 29, 949 A.2d at 630–31.  This Note does not address this part of the court’s
opinion.
152. See id. at 18–23, 949 A.2d at 624–627 (noting Maryland’s evolving position on in-
consistent verdicts).
153. Id. at 24, 949 A.2d at 627.
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and civil trials,154 Judge Eldridge recognized that Maryland common
law no longer accepts inconsistent verdicts outside the narrow scope
of criminal jury trials.155  Therefore, the court held that because there
is no longer a reasonable basis for allowing inconsistent verdicts of
“liability” in civil cases, Maryland courts must no longer recognize in-
consistent verdicts of “guilty” in criminal cases either.156
The Court of Appeals relied on “[t]he numerous exceptions to
the principle tolerating inconsistent verdicts,”157 and on the recent
cases Southern Management v. Taha158 and Galloway v. State,159 to sup-
port its holding.160  The court recognized that most jurisdictions still
allowed inconsistent jury verdicts in criminal cases, but decided that
the distinction between civil and criminal juries was illogical because
“[t]here is no reasonable basis for reversing the inconsistent verdict of
‘liability’ but not reversing the inconsistent verdict of ‘guilty.’”161
Judge Harrell filed a concurring opinion, joined by Judge Battag-
lia, to clarify the scope of the court’s holding and the proper proce-
dure a defendant and trial judge must follow to remedy inconsistent
verdicts.162  First, Judge Harrell distinguished a factual inconsistency
from a legal one, arguing that the majority’s holding should apply
only to the latter.163  Judge Harrell noted that the verdicts in this case
also contained a factual inconsistency because the jury acquitted Price
of being a felon in possession of a handgun, but convicted him of
possessing a handgun in the course of drug trafficking.164
Next, Judge Harrell analogized the rule against legally inconsis-
tent verdicts with the “rule of consistency,” applicable in conspiracy
cases.165  While one person alone cannot commit conspiracy, the State
154. Id. at 24–26, 949 A.2d at 627–29.
155. Id. at 23, 949 A.2d at 627.
156. Id. at 29, 949 A.2d at 630.
157. Id. at 23, 949 A.2d at 627.
158. Id. at 26, 949 A.2d at 628–29 (citing S. Mgmt. Corp. v. Taha, 378 Md. 461, 488, 836
A.2d 627, 642 (2003)).
159. Id. (citing Galloway v. State, 371 Md. 379, 400, 809 A.2d 653, 666 (2002)).
160. Id. at 26–27, 949 A.2d at 628–29.
161. Id. at 29, 949 A.2d at 630.
162. Id. at 34–35, 949 A.2d at 634 (Harrell, J., concurring).  Judge Wilner also joined
Judge Harrell’s discussion of the procedure required for a defendant to preserve for appel-
late review a challenge to a legally inconsistent verdict. Id.
163. Id. at 35, 949 A.2d at 634.
164. Id. at 37, 949 A.2d at 635.  Neither party had contested Price’s felon status. Id.
Under Judge Harrell’s concurrence, the jury would have the power to reach this illogically
inconsistent verdict because, for example, it could have thought that the State had not met
its burden of establishing Price’s felon status even though neither party contested it. Id.
165. Id. at 38, 949 A.2d at 636.
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need not try more than one conspirator.166  Judge Harrell proposed
that this rule should extend to allow the jury to convict Price of pos-
sessing a handgun with a nexus to drug trafficking even in the absence
of an underlying charge of drug trafficking.167
Finally, Judge Harrell described how a defendant should be able
to preserve an issue for appellate review.168  Judge Harrell stated that
the court should not prevent a defendant from accepting the jury’s
lenity and more importantly, a defendant should not be able to accept
the jury’s verdict at trial but then argue differently on appeal.169  First,
a defendant must properly note his or her objections to alleged incon-
sistent verdicts before the verdicts become final and the court dis-
charges the jury.170  Second, upon a defendant’s timely objection, the
trial court should instruct the jury on the need for consistency and the
range of permissible verdicts.171  Under Judge Harrell’s approach, the
jury must deliberate until it returns a verdict in the defendant’s favor,
convicts the defendant, or returns deadlocked.172
IV. ANALYSIS
In Price v. State, despite flawed reasoning, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland properly advanced Maryland’s policy of minimizing incon-
sistent verdicts by holding that Price’s conviction for possession of a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime could not
stand due to his acquittal of all drug trafficking charges.173  The
court’s rule, however, will unnecessarily interfere with the jury’s role
as the final arbiter of the facts because the court did not limit its hold-
ing to legally inconsistent verdicts.174  Moreover, the court failed to
give trial judges sufficient procedural direction regarding inconsistent
criminal jury verdicts.175  The Maryland Court of Appeals should have
remedied these concerns by adopting a rule similar to that proposed
166. Id. (citing Gardner v. State, 286 Md. 520, 524–25, 408 A.2d 1317, 1320 (1979)).
167. Id. at 38–39, 949 A.2d at 636.  According to Judge Harrell, the new rule for incon-
sistent verdicts should apply only to single trials and outright acquittals, and should not
apply when a jury deadlocks on one count but convicts on a compound offense of which
the former count is a necessary element. Id. at 39–40, 949 A.2d at 637.
168. Id. at 40–42, 949 A.2d at 637–38.
169. Id. at 40, 949 A.2d at 637.
170. Id. at 40–41, 949 A.2d 637–38 (quoting State v. Flemons, 144 S.W.3d 877, 881 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2004); citing State v. Pelz, 845 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)).
171. Id. at 41–42, 949 A.2d at 638.
172. Id. at 42, 949 A.2d at 638.
173. See infra Part IV.A.
174. See infra Part IV.B.1.
175. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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by Judge Harrell’s concurrence and established in the New York
Court of Appeals.176
A. The Price Court Properly Followed Maryland’s Trend Toward
Minimizing Inconsistent Verdicts, but Misstepped in its
Reasoning
In reaching its conclusion, the Price court properly recognized
that “Maryland’s traditional toleration of inconsistent verdicts has un-
dermined the intellectual justification for continuing to permit such
verdicts.”177  In coming to this determination, however, the court too
quickly dismissed the traditional reasons for tolerating inconsistent
verdicts178 and relied too heavily on the recent decision of Southern
Management Corporation v. Taha, which narrowly rejected irreconcilably
inconsistent verdicts in a civil case.179  The court depended excessively
on the similarities between civil and criminal trials by arguing that,
because Maryland no longer allows inconsistent verdicts in the con-
text of civil trials, it should also no longer allow them in criminal tri-
als.180  Still, the court properly held that in the present situation—
when a jury convicts the defendant for a compound felony, but ac-
quits on the predicate offense—the defendant’s conviction cannot
stand.181
The Price majority correctly discussed each of the exceptions to
Maryland’s long history of minimizing the “deleterious result” of in-
consistent verdicts.182  As the court noted, these exceptions have re-
duced the general rule to “one remaining situation where inconsistent
verdicts are tolerated, namely” inconsistent criminal jury verdicts.183
To adopt a well-informed policy for the future, however, the court
176. See infra notes 257–267 and accompanying text.
177. Price, 405 Md. at 34–35, 949 A.2d at 634 (Harrell, J., concurring); see also id. at
23–24, 949 A.2d at 627 (majority opinion) (noting that the numerous exceptions to the
principle tolerating inconsistent verdicts fully warrant a change in the common law policy
towards inconsistent verdicts).
178. See id. at 26, 949 A.2d at 629 (majority opinion) (“If the traditional reasons for
tolerating inconsistent jury verdicts are not sufficient in civil cases, those reasons are clearly
not sufficient in criminal cases.”).
179. See S. Mgmt. Corp. v. Taha, 378 Md. 461, 467, 836 A.2d 627, 630 (2003) (holding
that “irreconcilably inconsistent jury verdicts cannot stand under the theory of respondeat
superior liability”).
180. See infra notes 185–199 and accompanying text.
181. Price, 405 Md. at 34, 949 A.2d at 633.
182. See id. at 19–22, 949 A.2d at 624–26 (explaining the exceptions that Maryland
courts have recognized over the years); Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 595, 479 A.2d 1344,
1350 (1983) (“In order to avoid this deleterious result, the possibility of inconsistent ver-
dicts must be minimized.”); see also supra Part II.A.2.
183. Price, 405 Md. at 23, 949 A.2d at 627.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-4\MLR410.txt unknown Seq: 21 17-JUN-09 11:57
2009] PRICE V. STATE 1071
should have analyzed why Maryland has upheld inconsistent verdicts
for the past fifty-five years and whether these reasons still applied.184
The Court of Appeals of Maryland failed to conduct a well-in-
formed analysis because the majority improperly analogized the Taha
court’s abolition of inconsistent verdicts by a civil jury to those made
by a criminal jury in dismissing the traditional reasons for upholding
inconsistent verdicts.185  In so doing, the court failed to recognize that
Maryland originally adopted the Supreme Court’s rule on allowing in-
consistent verdicts to stand in the context of a criminal case, not a civil
case.186  In fact, the idea of applying the Dunn rule to civil jury trials is
relatively new187 and had not been adopted by the Court of Appeals
until Taha.188  Therefore, in illogically analogizing inconsistent crimi-
nal verdicts to inconsistent civil verdicts—a situation to which the
Court of Appeals never originally intended the Dunn rule apply—the
Price court missed the true issue: whether the traditional reasons for
allowing inconsistent criminal verdicts still apply.189
184. Maryland adopted the Dunn rule in 1953. See Leet v. State, 203 Md. 285, 293–94,
100 A.2d 789, 793–94 (1953).  The two traditional reasons for upholding inconsistent ver-
dicts include the jury’s historic or singular role in our justice system, and the fact that
inconsistencies ‘“may be the product of lenity, mistake, or a compromise to reach unanim-
ity.’” Price, 405 Md. at 19, 949 A.2d at 624 (quoting Galloway v. State, 371 Md. 379, 408,
809 A.2d 653, 671 (2002)).
185. Price, 405 Md. at 26, 949 A.2d at 628–29 (citing S. Mgmt. Corp. v. Taha, 378 Md.
461, 487, 836 A.2d 627, 642 (2003)).  The majority appears to have overlooked that the
Taha court recognized the special importance of the Dunn rule as applied to criminal
cases, and that the treatment of irreconcilably inconsistent verdicts in the civil context may
differ from the treatment in criminal trials. Taha, 378 Md. at 486–87, 836 A.2d at 641–42.
186. See Leet, 203 Md. at 288, 294, 100 A.2d at 790, 794 (adopting the Dunn rule while
convicting the defendant of willfully failing to file a state income tax return).  While Mary-
land courts are not required to follow Supreme Court policy, interestingly, the Supreme
Court has never applied their rule for inconsistent verdicts to a civil jury trial. See, e.g.,
Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 189–90 (2005) (Souter, J., concurring) (discussing the
Powell and Dunn rules in the context of a capital murder case); Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S.
339, 341–43 & n.7 (1981) (discussing the Dunn rule in the context of a state prisoner’s
habeas corpus challenge).
187. The Court of Special Appeals originally extended the Dunn rule to civil jury ver-
dicts in Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 84 Md. App. 10, 35–36, 578 A.2d 228, 240, rev’d in
part, 326 Md. 179, 604 A.2d 445 (1992).  Even though the Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court’s discussion of inconsistent civil verdicts, the Court of Special Appeals later
reiterated the principle to allow inconsistent civil verdicts to stand. See Davis v. Goodman,
117 Md. App. 378, 423, 700 A.2d 798, 820 (1997) (citing Balbos, 84 Md. App. at 35–36, 578
A.2d at 240) (noting that inconsistencies in civil verdicts often are the result of compro-
mise to reach unanimity or mistake).
188. See Taha, 378 Md. at 486–88, 836 A.2d at 641–43.  The Taha court both extended
the rule to civil jury trials and held that the rule no longer applies. Id.
189. See Price, 405 Md. at 18–19, 949 A.2d at 624 (noting the traditional reasons for
allowing inconsistent verdicts in criminal jury cases to stand); Taha, 378 Md. at 488, 386
A.2d at 642 (discussing inconsistent civil and criminal verdicts and concluding that “there
remains a distinction between inconsistent verdicts in criminal cases and irreconcilably incon-
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Moreover, in abolishing civil inconsistent verdicts, even the Taha
court did not analyze whether the historic role of the jury, or more
importantly, the jury’s right to exercise lenity, should still allow such
verdicts to stand.190  Instead, the Taha court solely analogized its case
to a case involving a special verdict form.191  In both Taha and Price,
however, the jury issued a general verdict.192  Moreover, unlike the
jury in a civil trial, the jury in a criminal trial generally does not have
the option of issuing a special verdict.193  The Taha court also made
no judgment as to the value of lenity in a civil trial, but held that civil
cases involved the same potential for jury compromises and mistakes
as criminal cases.194  Courts on both sides of the inconsistent verdicts
discussion have cited lenity as an important power of the jury.195  As
Judge Harrell noted in his concurring opinion in Price, “[t]he defen-
dant should not be foreclosed from accepting the jury’s lenity.”196
When the court interferes with the jury’s power to exercise lenity, it
also interferes with the jury’s role as the fair arbiter to assess moral
blameworthiness.197  Distinct from a guilty verdict based on lenity, a
guilty verdict founded on a mistake or compromise violates a defen-
dant’s right to a verdict by the reasonable doubt standard.198  There-
sistent jury verdicts in civil matters”).  Had the court intended the rule to apply to civil cases,
it would not have taken until 1990 to first do so. Cf. Balbos, 84 Md. App. at 36, 478 A.2d at
240 (“[W]e realize that this precedent has previously been applied by Maryland courts only
in criminal cases.”).
190. Taha, 378 Md. at 487–88, 836 A.2d at 642–43.
191. Id. at 488, 836 A.2d at 642–43 (quoting S & R, Inc. v. Nails, 85 Md. App. 570, 590,
584 A.2d 722, 731 (1991)).
192. See Price, 405 Md. at 15, 949 A.2d at 622 (noting the jury’s guilty and not guilty
verdicts at the trial level); Taha, 378 Md. at 503–04, 836 A.2d at 651–52 (Raker, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that the rule on which the Taha majority relied cannot apply where the jury
uses a general verdict rather than a special verdict).
193. See Kate H. Nepveu, Beyond “Guilty” or “Not Guilty”: Giving Special Verdicts in Criminal
Jury Trials, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 263, 263 (2003) (recognizing that “[s]pecial verdicts are
generally disfavored in criminal trials”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a) (discussing the use of a
special verdict in the context of a civil jury trial); Price, 405 Md. at 36 n.3, 949 A.2d at 635
n.3 (acknowledging that, while a special verdict may illuminate the factual basis for a jury’s
verdict in a civil trial, such an inquiry is inappropriate in criminal cases).
194. Taha, 378 Md. at 487, 836 A.2d at 642 (majority opinion).
195. Compare United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 68–69 (1984) (recognizing the impor-
tance of the jury’s exercise of lenity), with People v. Tucker, 431 N.E.2d 617, 619 (N.Y.
1981) (noting that the court should not undermine the jury’s accepted power of lenity).
196. Price, 405 Md. at 40, 949 A.2d at 637 (Harrell, J., concurring).
197. See infra notes 225–230 and accompanying text.
198. Compare Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 218, 220 (Fla. 2007) (“As a general rule . . .
[i]nconsistent verdicts are allowed because jury verdicts can be the result of lenity and
therefore do not speak to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.”), and Powell, 469 U.S.
at 66–67 (noting that jury lenity, unlike jury compromise or mistake, works in favor of the
defendant), with Muller, supra note 2, at 796 (commenting that, in practice, when a jury
returns a compromised verdict in a criminal trial, the jury has failed to convict the defen-
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fore, lenity—unlike compromise and mistake—is a jury power worth
protecting.199
Instead of improperly relying on Taha,200 the court should have
instead independently analyzed whether the traditional reasons for al-
lowing inconsistent verdicts to stand remained valid, and if so,
whether the court could uphold these traditional reasons by abolish-
ing inconsistent criminal verdicts.201  If the court had conducted such
an analysis, it would have likely reached a conclusion similar to Judge
Harrell’s: abolishing legally inconsistent verdicts while still recogniz-
ing the importance of the traditional reasons.202  Therefore, while the
Price court correctly reversed the defendant’s inconsistent conviction,
its analysis led the court to adopt a policy that has the potential to
cause problems for future courts dealing with inconsistent verdicts.203
dant at the required threshold of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt).  While a compro-
mised verdict may decrease hung juries, the verdict violates the defendant’s constitutional
right to a unanimous jury decision beyond a reasonable doubt. See MD. CONST. art. 21
(stating “[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to a speedy trial by
an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found guilty”); In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments requires a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
199. See Powell, 469 U.S. at 66 (recognizing that the jury’s lenity power indicated that the
inconsistent verdict may in fact favor the criminal defendant over the government); see also
Muller, supra note 2, at 795 (noting that lenity is the primary reason for accepting inconsis-
tent verdicts, but arguing instead that Powell protects mistake and compromise, both of
which are not worth protecting).
200. See supra Part II.A.2; supra notes 185–198 and accompanying text.
201. See infra Part IV.B.1.
202. See Price v. State, 405 Md. 10, 36 n.3, 949 A.2d 619, 635 n.3 (2008) (Harrell, J.,
concurring) (noting that Maryland should have adopted the “majority of the minority”
position because appellate courts are ill-equipped to interfere with the traditional role of
the jury as the fact-finder).  In conducting this analysis, the court would have found signifi-
cant precedential support for the traditional reasons for allowing inconsistent verdicts to
stand.  First, a criminal jury has a singular role as the arbiter of the facts. See, e.g., Shell v.
State, 307 Md. 46, 54, 512 A.2d 358, 362 (1986) (citing Powell, 469 U.S. at 65–66) (caution-
ing that the court must take care to not review inconsistencies for fear of undermining the
historic role of the jury); Ford v. State, 274 Md. 546, 553, 337 A.2d 81, 85–86 (1975) (re-
jecting reversal of inconsistent criminal verdicts because the court must protect the singu-
lar role of a criminal jury).  And, second, the court must protect the jury’s power to assess
the defendant’s moral blameworthiness. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 374 Md. 693, 711, 824
A.2d 123, 134 (2003) (recognizing the jury’s role as representatives of the community’s
conscience); Galloway v. State, 371 Md. 379, 408–09, 809 A.2d 653, 671 (2002) (noting
ample support for the jury’s power to insure lenity as the voice of the country).  Such an
analysis would have allowed for a bright-line rule, which would better guide the lower
courts on how to define an inconsistent verdict. See infra notes 220–224 and accompanying
text.
203. See People v. Tucker, 431 N.E.2d 617, 619 (N.Y. 1981) (implying that a court must
exercise care when adopting a new policy for handling inconsistent verdicts because the
court could easily intrude on the jury’s deliberative process); infra Part IV.B; see also Price,
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B. The Majority’s Holding May Lead to an Influx of Inconsistency
Claims
Although the Price court correctly reversed the jury’s inconsistent
verdicts, the Court of Appeals of Maryland failed to sufficiently limit
the scope of its holding by restricting its review to only legally inconsis-
tent verdicts.204  The majority also failed to instruct future trial courts
on how to handle potentially inconsistent verdicts.205  These two er-
rors led to an inappropriately broad holding that may initiate an in-
flux of appeals.
1. The Majority Failed to Limit the Breadth of its Holding to Legally
Inconsistent Verdicts
In Price v. State, even though the Court of Appeals of Maryland
properly reversed the defendant’s conviction, the court took a sel-
dom-traveled path by forbidding all inconsistent verdicts.206 Price has
the potential to interfere with the jury’s decision-making power, some-
thing the court must not do lightly.207  Instead, the Price majority
should have adopted Judge Harrell’s concurrence which would have
limited the court’s review to legally inconsistent verdicts.208
A court faced with the inquiry of how to respond to inconsistent
verdicts can forbid both factually and legally inconsistent verdicts,209
or can prohibit only factual inconsistencies.210  The majority improp-
erly chose the first approach, which requires an appellate court to an-
alyze a jury’s fact-finding by speculating how the jury perceived and
405 Md. at 36 n.3, 949 A.2d at 635 n.3 (noting that courts are ill-equipped to interfere with
the singular role of the jury as the fact-finder).
204. See infra Part IV.B.1.
205. See infra Part IV.B.2.
206. Price, 405 Md. at 29, 949 A.2d 630 (majority opinion).  Only Alaska has abolished all
types of inconsistent verdicts.  DeSacia v. State, 469 P.2d 369, 373–74 (Alaska 1970).
207. See infra notes 225–230 and accompanying text.  In conducting any review of a jury
verdict, the court must tread lightly to avoid interfere with the province of the jury because
the “nullification of [a] jury verdict is the denial of a person’s constitutional and common
law right to be tried by a jury of his or her peers.” Galloway, 371 Md. at 400–01, 809 A.2d at
666.
208. Price, 405 Md. at 35, 949 A.2d at 634 (Harrell, J., concurring).
209. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.  This approach requires an appellate
court to review the record in its entirety to ascertain the underlying basis of the jury’s
determination.  People v. Tucker, 431 N.E.2d 617, 619 (N.Y. 1981).
210. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.  For this approach, the trial or appellate
court would reverse a conviction only after looking at the face of the jury’s conviction and
determining that the acquittal on one crime is conclusive as to a necessary element of the
conviction on the other crime. Tucker, 431 N.E.2d at 619–20.
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weighed the evidence.211  An appellate court, however, is ill-equipped
to analyze the fact-finding of a criminal jury in particular212 because
judges are prohibited from inquiring into the jury’s mental process or
into their statements made during deliberation.213  Allowing such
speculation would likely cause a judge to substitute his or her own
analysis for the jury’s.214  In addition, the court can easily perceive the
jury’s valid exercise of lenity toward the defendant as an irrational
act.215  As Judge Harrell noted in his concurrence, allowing review for
factual inconsistencies might ‘“confuse a [jury’s] curious verdict with
an inconsistent verdict.’”216
Moreover, prohibiting factually inconsistent verdicts would create
a rule more inconsistent than the inconsistent verdict itself.  Just as a
judge and a jury may perceive evidence differently, so can two simi-
larly situated judges.217  Because different people place different
weight on the evidence based on their past education and exper-
211. See Tucker, 431 N.E.2d at 619 (noting that this approach requires the appellate
court to ascertain the underlying basis of the jury’s determination).
212. Price, 405 Md. at 36 n.3, 949 A.2d at 635 n.3.  An appellate court may be better able
to make a factual inquiry into a jury’s verdict in the civil context if the court uses a special
verdict form. Id.  In the criminal context, however, the court does not have the luxury of a
special verdict form. Id.
213. See Stokes v. State, 379 Md. 618, 637–38, 843 A.2d 64, 75 (2004) (“Such evidence is
forbidden by public policy since it would disclose the secrets of the jury room and afford
an opportunity for fraud or perjury.”).  Although a judge has the power to determine
whether the record contains sufficient evidence to reasonably warrant a finding of guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979), this “sufficiency
review is simply too toothless and too deferential to the jury and its irrational verdict.”
Muller, supra note 2, at 824.
214. Jurors weigh evidence based on their past education and personal experiences
while judges are trained to view evidence through the prism of laws. Compare Sharon
Blanchard Hawk, State v. Mann: Extraneous Prejudicial Information in the Jury Room: Beautiful
Minds Allowed, 34 N.M. L. REV. 149, 161–62 (2004) (noting that “jurors may properly rely
on their background, including professional and educational experience”), with Jonathan
T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance Between Judicial Minimalism and Neutral
Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1793–94 (2004) (noting that judges generally ground their
decisions in existing legal materials).  Unlike a judge, a jury is better able to draw on their
everyday practical experiences as an ordinary member of the community.  Douglas G.
Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Re-
form, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 484–85 (1997).  As a result, a jury may perceive and weigh a
witness’s credibility differently than an educated judge. Id.
215. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 66 (1984) (noting “as imprudent and un-
workable,” a rule allowing judges to inquire into the underlying basis of a jury’s verdict).
216. Price, 405 Md. at 36 n.3, 949 A.2d at 635 n.3 (quoting Hudson v. State, 152 Md.
App. 488, 515, 832 A.2d 834, 850 (2003)).
217. Compare DeSacia v. State, 469 P.2d 369, 373–74 (Alaska 1970) (holding that a jury’s
verdicts were inconsistent because the verdicts differentiated between the defendant’s con-
duct towards two different victims), with Naumowicz v. State, 562 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla.
1990) (holding that the jury’s verdicts were not necessarily inconsistent when the jury dif-
ferentiated between the defendant’s conduct as to two different victims).
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iences, one judge may rationalize a verdict as inconsistent while an-
other may not.218  As a result, the Price holding exposes appellate
courts to a potential flood of inconsistency claims with little guidance
on how they should rule.219
The court should have instead adopted the approach of Judge
Harrell and the New York Court of Appeals that prohibits only legally
inconsistent verdicts.220  Under this approach, a trial or appellate
court would reverse a conviction only after looking at the face of a
jury’s conviction and determining that the acquittal on one crime is
conclusive as to a necessary element of the conviction on the other
crime.221  This bright-line rule would provide predictability for the
parties and guidance for the lower courts.222  The rule would not re-
quire a judge to infer a jury’s motives, intent, or understanding.223
Instead, under this rule, although the jury is free to consider each
element of a crime separately, it must decide identical elements
consistently.224
The Court of Appeals also erred by not considering the impor-
tance of the jury’s role as the voice of the country and arbiter of the
facts.225  The primary justification behind the right to a jury trial is the
jury’s role as a “fair arbiter of a criminal defendant’s moral blamewor-
thiness.”226  This justification is exemplified in the jury’s valid power
of lenity toward the defendant.227  Jury lenity can occur in two in-
218. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
219. See Price, 405 Md. at 35, 949 A.2d at 634 (noting that a proper procedure is neces-
sary to give guidance and spare the appellate court unnecessary appeals).
220. See id. at 35–36, 949 A.2d at 634 (stating that “a legally inconsistent verdict occurs
where a jury acts contrary to a trial judge’s proper instructions regarding the law”); People
v. Tucker, 431 N.E.2d 617, 619 (1981) (noting that the court should review the jury charge
to ascertain whether an acquittal on one crime as charged is conclusive as to a necessary
element of the other crime, for which the guilty verdict was rendered).
221. Tucker, 431 N.E.2d at 619–20.  For example, if crime 1 included element A, and
crime 2 included elements A and B, a guilty verdict on crime 2 would be inconsistent with
an acquittal on crime 1.
222. See Price, 405 Md. at 34–35, 949 A.2d at 634 (noting that narrowing scope of the
majority’s holding and delineating the proper procedure for future trial courts will give
guidance and spare appellate courts from unnecessary appeals).
223. See, e.g., Ashlee Smith, Vice-A-Verdict: Legally Inconsistent Jury Verdicts Should Not Stand
in Maryland, 35 U. BALT. L. REV. 395, 414 (2006) (arguing that Maryland should still allow
factually inconsistent verdicts).
224. See Tucker, 431 N.E.2d at 619–20 (explaining the application of this rule).
225. See State v. Williams, 397 Md. 172, 189–90, 916 A.2d 294, 305 (2007) (citing Gallo-
way v. State, 371 Md. 379, 408–09, 809 A.2d 653, 671 (2002)) (recognizing the “unique role
of the jury” as “voice of the country” and arbiter of the facts).
226. Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Decisions at Conviction: Recognizing the Jury as Fault-
Finder, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 91, 95–99.
227. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65–66 (1984) (noting the importance
of the jury’s right to exercise lenity).
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stances: first, the jury may exercise lenity where it believes that a crimi-
nal law is unjust because it punishes conduct that is not morally
blameworthy; or second, the jury may exercise lenity where it believes
it is unfair to apply a particular criminal law to a defendant’s con-
duct.228  Unlike a jury, however, a judge is not in a position to mea-
sure the community conscience.229  As a result, by prohibiting factual
inconsistencies, the jury loses its safeguard against oppressive judges
who would overturn an inconsistent verdict even if it results from the
jury’s mercy.230
The Price majority should have adopted the “majority of the mi-
nority”231 position by narrowly defining an inconsistent verdict as one
that contains a legal inconsistency.232  Instead, the Maryland Court of
Appeals overextended precedent by establishing a rule that may inter-
fere with the province of the jury as the voice of the country and the
arbiter of the facts.
2. The Price Majority Failed to Adopt a Constitutionally Acceptable
Procedure to Guide Trial Courts on How to Handle Legally
Inconsistent Verdicts
Unlike the majority, which neglected to provide any procedure
for future courts on how to handle inconsistent verdicts,233 Judge Har-
rell’s concurring opinion “highlight[ed] the procedure required in
order for a defendant to preserve for appellate review a challenge to a
legally inconsistent verdict.”234  The majority should have similarly
provided guidance for the lower courts to avoid an overflow of appeals
due to apparent inconsistencies.
In adopting a procedure for future decisions, the majority should
have evaluated different approaches to determine the one best-suited
for Maryland common law.  Maryland has a unique common law and,
228. See Smith, supra note 223, at 404 (citing Muller, supra note 2, at 784) (noting the
two ways a jury can exercise lenity).
229. See Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 55, 512 A.2d 358, 362 (1986) (noting that unlike a
jury, the “judge is hardly the ‘voice of the country,’ even when he sits in the jury’s place”).
230. George C. Harris, The Communitarian Function of the Criminal Jury Trial and the Rights
of the Accused, 74 NEB. L. REV. 804, 807 (1995) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
156 (1968)).
231. Price v. State, 405 Md. 10, 36 n.3, 949 A.2d 619, 635 n.3 (2008) (Harrell, J.,
concurring).
232. Id.
233. The court simply held that “inconsistent verdicts shall no longer be allowed,” and
then ended its opinion. Id. at 29, 949 A.2d at 630 (majority opinion).
234. Id. at 40–42, 949 A.2d at 637–39 (Harrell, J., concurring).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-4\MLR410.txt unknown Seq: 28 17-JUN-09 11:57
1078 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 68:1051
as a result, a thorough analysis of the different options is necessary.235
The different options include the New York Court of Appeals’ con-
crete procedure for inconsistent verdicts236 and Professor Eric
Muller’s three different approaches for handling inconsistent ver-
dicts.237  When analyzed under the Maryland Court of Appeals’ prece-
dent and procedural rules, each approach has its own virtues and
shortcomings.
Professor Muller’s first proposed approach is the “harmless error
review,” whereby an appellate court must reverse an inconsistent con-
viction unless the government can prove the error is harmless.238  The
harmless error review standard has a higher threshold burden than a
sufficiency of the evidence review.239  Under this approach, an appel-
late court does not consider evidence in the light most favorable to
the state, but instead looks for overwhelming evidence to support the
defendant’s conviction.240  The harmless error review standard is in-
sufficient under Maryland law because the rule does not limit incon-
sistent verdicts.241  Rather, it requires a reviewing court to speculate
on how the jury perceived and weighed the evidence, which intrudes
on the jury’s deliberative process as the arbiter of the facts, an ap-
proach that courts have uniformly rejected.242
Professor Muller’s second method requires a trial judge to reject
any inconsistent verdict and send the jury back for further delibera-
tion before the court finalizes the verdict.243  Professor Muller dislikes
this option because it would either prevent the jury from exercising
lenity or generate discussion between the jury and the trial judge
235. In particular, the court must take care to avoid any double jeopardy consequences.
See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text.  In Maryland, until the announcement that
the clerk has recorded the verdict, the jury has a right to amend its verdict without any
double jeopardy consequences. Price, 405 Md. at 42 & n.11, 949 A.2d at 638 & n.11 (citing
Heinze v. State, 184 Md. 613, 617, 42 A.2d 128, 130 (1945)).
236. See People v. Satloff, 437 N.E.2d 271, 272 (N.Y. 1982) (noting the court’s procedure
for handling inconsistent verdicts).
237. Id. at 821–34 (explaining three proposed methods, each based in existing court
rules, to deal with inconsistent verdicts).
238. Muller, supra note 2, at 822–26.
239. Id. at 824.
240. Id.
241. See supra Part II.A.2 (explaining Maryland’s policy of minimizing the occurrence of
inconsistent verdicts).
242. Galloway v. State, 371 Md. 379, 406, 809 A.2d 653, 670 (2002); People v. Tucker,
431 N.E.2d 617, 619 (N.Y. 1981); see also United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 66 (1984)
(noting that courts generally will avoid inquiring into the jury deliberations); supra notes
194–199 and accompanying text.
243. See Muller, supra note 2, at 826–28 (explaining the “refusal to accept inconsistent
verdicts test”).
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about the actual basis of the jury’s verdict.244  Maryland law seems to
support this method if limited to a review for legal inconsistency.245
For example, Maryland rules permit a judge to instruct a jury to retire
for further deliberations.246  In addition, Maryland courts allow trial
judges to refuse verdicts which are defective in form or substance.247
The court in Heinze v. State specifically declared it “essential for the
prompt and efficient administration of justice . . . to ascertain the real
intention of the jury in their finding.”248  A court accomplishes this
goal by explaining to the jury the defect in its verdict and providing
the jury an opportunity to correct this defect.  However, when in-
structing the jury, the trial judge must take care not to improperly
influence the jury.249  As long as the trial judge refuses to accept in-
consistent verdicts before they are final, the jury’s further delibera-
tions do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.250  This method,
however, requires a trial judge to reject inconsistent verdicts.  Conse-
quently, the approach would prevent a defendant from accepting a
jury’s lenity, instead giving the court too much discretion to force a
review.  A defendant must remain free to accept a verdict in his favor
without any potential influence by the trial judge.251
Professor Muller’s third method of handling inconsistent verdicts
requires a defendant either to accept both the guilty and not guilty
verdicts or reject them by moving for a mistrial before the court
records the verdicts and makes them final.252  If a defendant accepts
the verdicts, the defendant would be foreclosed from objecting to the
244. Id. at 827.
245. See Smith, supra note 223, at 418 (noting that when a jury returns an inconsistent
verdict, Maryland law allows the court to direct the jury to retire for further deliberations);
see also Tucker, 431 N.E.2d at 619–620 (noting that a look at the jury instructions does not
require any speculation into the deliberative process of the jury and allows the jury to
leniency).
246. MD. R. § 4-327(e) (permitting the judge to send the jury back to the deliberation
room, or to declare a hung jury).
247. See Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 599–600, 479 A.2d 1344, 1352 (1984) (recognizing
that the trial court has the power to set aside a verdict when the jury misapplies the law).
248. Heinze v. State, 184 Md. 613, 617, 42 A.2d 128, 130 (1945).
249. Id. at 618, 42 A.2d at 131.
250. Muller, supra note 2, at 829.
251. Price v. State, 405 Md. 10, 40 n.9, 949 A.2d 619, 637 n.9 (2008) (Harrell, J., concur-
ring).  Failure to do so is the “denial of a person’s constitutional and common law right to
be tried by a jury of his or her peers.”  Galloway v. State, 371 Md. 379, 400–01, 809 A.2d
653, 666 (2002) (reasoning in the context of inconsistent verdicts between a trial judge
and a jury).
252. Muller, supra note 2, at 832.  Muller argues that this approach is fair to defendants
because the defendant is in a far better position than appellate courts to know whether the
jury punished the defendant with a groundless conviction. Id.
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inconsistent verdicts on appeal.253  Alternatively, if a defendant moves
for a mistrial, then the defendant would give up any chance to accept
the inconsistent verdicts and risk losing all verdicts not in his or her
favor.254  This method prevents the jury from resolving inconsistent
verdicts on its own after further deliberation.255  In addition, this ap-
proach places too much strain on the prosecutor and the court system
by requiring a new trial at the defendant’s request.256
Instead of any of these approaches, none of which considered the
particular constraints of Maryland law, the Maryland Court of Appeals
should have adopted a procedure similar to that proposed in Judge
Harrell’s concurring opinion and to the procedure used by the New
York Court of Appeals.257  This procedure is a combination of Profes-
sor Muller’s second and third methods.  Under this approach, after
the court announces the jury’s verdict, “a defendant must note his or
her objection to allegedly [legally] inconsistent verdicts prior to the
verdicts becoming final and the discharge of the jury.”258  Upon a
timely objection, the trial court should reinstruct the jury on the need
for consistency and the range of permissible verdicts.259  The judge
should then permit the jurors to resume deliberations outside the
presence of the court.260  At this point, the jury may resolve the legal
inconsistency in one of three ways: (1) return the verdict in the defen-
dant’s favor; (2) convict the defendant on all counts; or (3) deadlock
and have the judge declare a mistrial.261
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See Heinze v. State, 184 Md. 613, 617, 42 A.2d 128, 130 (1945) (noting that before
the recording of the verdict, the jury has the right to amend or change any verdict).  Any
amendment of a verdict prior to its recording would not cause any double jeopardy conse-
quences. See supra note 250 and accompanying text; infra note 266 and accompanying text.
256. Muller, supra note 2, at 832 (noting that this approach requires the prosecutor to
bring the defendant to trial again at the government’s expense).
257. See infra notes 263–266 and accompanying text. Compare Price v. State, 405 Md. 10,
41–42, 949 A.2d 619, 638–39 (2008) (Harrell, J., concurring) (explaining his procedure
for inconsistent verdicts), and People v. Satloff, 437 N.E.2d 271, 272 (N.Y. 1982) (noting
that the defendant must object to an inconsistent verdict prior to the discharge of the
jury), with Muller, supra note 2, at 831–32 (explaining the “mistrial at the defendant’s op-
tion” approach). See also State v. Flemons, 144 S.W.3d 877, 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (not-
ing that the defendant must present to the trial court his claim that the verdict is
inconsistent before the jury is discharged).
258. Price, 405 Md. at 40, 949 A.2d at 637.
259. Id. at 41–42, 949 A.2d at 638.
260. Id. at 42, 949 A.2d at 638.
261. Id.
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Although a defendant has little time to decide whether to accept
or reject the legally inconsistent verdict,262 this approach provides sub-
stantial benefits for the court system.  First, this method spares appel-
late courts from an influx of unnecessary appeals.263  Second, by
reinstructing the jurors, the court assures that the jury understood the
jury instructions and did not render a mistaken verdict,264 and that
the verdict was not due to the jury’s failure to convict the defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt.265  Finally, the jury’s resumed delibera-
tion does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause
because the jury will have not yet returned a final verdict.266  For these
reasons, the majority should have adopted Judge Harrell and the New
York Court of Appeals’ procedure describing the method in which a
defendant can preserve for appellate review a challenge to a legally
inconsistent verdict.267
V. CONCLUSION
In Price v. State, despite inconsistent reasoning, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland properly followed Maryland’s long-standing policy
of minimizing inconsistent verdicts in holding that Price’s conviction
for possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking
crime could not stand due to his acquittal of all drug trafficking
charges.268  In so holding, however, the court adopted a rule that will
unnecessarily interfere with the jury’s role as the final arbiter of the
facts because the court failed to limit its holding to legally inconsistent
262. Id. at 41, 949 A.2d at 637–38 (recognizing the rule from the Court of Appeals of
New York); Satloff, 437 N.E.2d at 272 (noting that the defendant must note his objection
prior to the discharge of the jury or the claim is waived).
263. Price, 405 Md. at 35, 949 A.2d at 634; see also Satloff, 437 N.E.2d at 272 (citing People
v. Stahl, 425 N.E.2d 876, 877 (N.Y. 1981)) (noting that New York requires the defendant to
raise the inconsistency issue at the trial level in order to minimize the burden on the ap-
peals system).
264. See Price, 405 Md. at 41–42, 949 A.2d at 638 (noting that the trial court should
instruct the jury on the need for consistency and the range of permissible verdicts).  By
reinstructing the jury, the judge can call attention to any defect without improperly influ-
encing the jury.  Heinze v. State, 184 Md. 613, 617, 42 A.2d 128, 130 (1945).
265. See DeSacia v. State, 469 P.2d 369, 377–78 (Alaska 1970) (noting that the possibility
of a compromise verdict, one that does not reach the standard of a reasonable doubt, has
led the court to no longer allow inconsistent verdicts); Wax, supra note 124, at 738 (noting
that rejecting inconsistent verdicts helps ensure that the defendant’s guilt is proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt).
266. See Price, 405 Md. at 42 n.11, 949 A.2d at 638 n.11 (recognizing that the double
jeopardy prohibition “prevents further deliberation on an acquittal only after that verdict
is final”).
267. Id. at 40–42, 949 A.2d at 637.
268. See supra Part IV.A.
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verdicts.269  Moreover, the court neglected to give future trial courts
sufficient procedural direction regarding inconsistent criminal jury
verdicts.270  Instead, the Maryland Court of Appeals should have
adopted a rule similar to those adhered to by Judge Harrell’s concur-
rence and the New York Court of Appeals.271  By limiting its holding
to a review of legally inconsistent verdicts—where an acquittal on one
count negates a necessary element for a conviction on another
count—the court could have adopted a procedure that adheres to the
constraints of Maryland law to provide guidance for future trial courts.
269. See supra Part IV.B.1.
270. See supra Part IV.B.2.
271. See supra notes 257–267 and accompanying text.
